(DOWNLOAD) "Cappillino v. Hyde Park Central School District" by Second Circuit U.S. Court Of Appeals # Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Cappillino v. Hyde Park Central School District
- Author : Second Circuit U.S. Court Of Appeals
- Release Date : January 30, 1998
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 65 KB
Description
Sharon Cappillino and her son, Peter, appeal from Judge Brieant's denial of their Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside a stipulated settlement and to reopen their action brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (""IDEA""), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the time of the stipulation, the district court made clear that if no party sought to reopen the action within 45 days, the settlement would be binding on the parties. Within the 45-day period, however, Sharon Cappillino wrote a letter to the court indicating that she was firing her lawyer because of her dissatisfaction with the settlement. The district court denied the subsequent Rule 60(b) request to set aside the settlement and reopen the case. We reverse. The Cappillinos brought suit pursuant to the IDEA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that appellees had denied Peter Cappillino a ""free appropriate public education"" and had violated the Cappillinos' due process rights. At a hearing on September 29, 1995, Russell Schindler, then counsel for the Cappillinos, informed the court that a tentative settlement had been reached, pending approval by the Hyde Park Central School District (the ""School District"") and its insurance carrier. After being informed of the settlement's terms, the court agreed to discontinue the action so that the necessary approval of the School District and its insurance carrier could be obtained. The court noted the tentative nature of the settlement, telling the parties that ""f the settlement falls through, you can reopen it"" within the 45-day period. When Schindler inquired about the appropriate procedure for reopening the case within the 45 days, the court responded that a letter to the court, rather than a formal motion, would suffice.